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The last words in the Lysis are eloquent enough and induce us, at first, to 
feel disappointed: «what a friend is, we have not yet succeeded in discover- 
ingni (O6nco 6E 0.61 íktiv Ó cpiho~ oioi t e  Eyevóyeea EEeug~iv: 223b7-8). 
Just before these words, after Socrates' summary of what had been said in that 
part of the dialogue (a summary like those that orators used to pronounce be- 
fore tribunals), we hear from Socrates' own mouth, and in just as conclusive a 
way: «If none of these is a friend, 1 am at a loss for anything further to say» (ei 
pq6Ev to6tov rpihov Eatív, Eyh pEv oGniti Exco t i  AÉyco: 222e6-7). The fail- 
ure of the quest seems evident enough. Accordingly, many scholars have 
reached a definitive conclusion: the Lysis is a dialogue without an outcome. 
The aporia, to which we have been led by the different examinations to which 
the question about friendship asked to Menexenus has been subjected, is finally 
witnessed in 223b7-8. At the beginning of his conversation with Menexenus, 
when the latter was on his way back after having helped in a religious cere- 
mony, Socrates asked him this question following Lysis' request: «When one 
person loves another, which of the two becomes a friend of the other, the lov- 
ing of the loved, or the loved of the loving? Or is there no difference?» 
(EnaiGav ti5 tiva cp~hq, nótego5 not6gou cpihoc yiyvetct~, Ó q~A6v toU 
cpihoupivou $ Ó cpihoUp~v05 toV cpihof~vto~ oO6Ev G~acpÉ~ai; 212a8-bl). 
With this question starts that part of the dialogue whose direct aim is to answer 
with arguments the question about friendship. However, at the end of the dia- 
* This paper was read at the 5th Simposium Platonicum of the International Plato Society, 
held from 19 to 23 August 1998 at the University olFToronto. 
1.  Plato. III. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. English translation by W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Clas- 
sical Library), London 1925, p. 71 (223b 7-8). From here on, we will quote from this translation. 
As regards the original Greek text, we will use J. Biirnet's edition. 
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logue, we reach a cul-de-sac. We could well say, with W. K. C. Guthrie that 
«the Lysis is not a success. Even Plato can n ~ d » ~ .  If he is not deeply attentive 
to the literary and philosophical aspects of the dialogue in its entirety, the 
reader is bound to be left with the bitter aftertaste caused by a disappointing 
reading. In these pages we intend to explain what, to our understanding, is pre- 
cisely one of the hermeneutical clues that allows us to comprehend the Lysis. 
We will try to do so, in a necessarily brief way, by making, first of all, place for 
some considerations about the so-called «final aporia»3 of the Lysis and will 
then proceed to emphasize the importance of accomplishing and comprehend- 
ing friendship -of realizing it and also of realizing what it is- al1 along the three 
discourses that Plato's Lysis offers us. With this, we believe that we will be able 
to uphold our thesis: the Lysis is a dialogue where, in spite of the fact that we 
cannot succeed in discovering (ESEWQE~V in 223b8), by means of the logical 
discourse, 'what a friend is', we can, nonetheless, succeed in bringing about 
friendship and in comprehending it -realizing it and realizing what it means- 
as the same dialogue advances. As a consequence, friendship can only be com- 
prehended in the cours of the process that leads to its accomplishment and, at 
the same time, it can be accomplished only insofar as it is comprehended. 
Comprehension and accomplishment are both parts of a whole in the exer- 
cise of the virtues and, consequently, in the exercise of friendship. However, 
comprehension will never, in Plato's first dialogues -the aporetical ones- give 
way to a «definition», at least in its modo aristotelico4. This is the reason why, 
2. W. K. C. GUTHRIE, A H i s t o ~  of Greek Philosophy. IV Plato. The Man and his Dialogues, 
Cambridge 1975, p. 143. Since ancient times, the Socratic tradition used to regard the Lysis as a 
Socratic misinterpretation on the part of the young Plato (cf. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, De clarorurn 
philosophorum vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatib~~s libri decem, 1, 3, 35). 
3. We analysed the «final aporia» of Plato's Lysis in a paper presented the ISth setember 
1997 in the Seminar «Hermeneutica i Platonismen at the «Societat Catalana de Filosofia» (Insti- 
tut d'Estudis Catalans - Barcelona), published under the title Notes per una lectura de 1"aporia 
jinal'del Lisis platonic (Notes for a reading oj'the '&al aporia' in Plato S Lysis), Barcelona, Edi- 
cions KAL-Universitat de Barcelona, 1998. Regarding to the 'final aporia' we read in V. GOLD- 
SCHMIDT, Les dialogues de Platon, Paris 1947, p. 62: «C'est improprement qu'on peut intituler 
ainsi ("CEssence et 1'Aporie finale") la demiere partie des cinq dialogues (Euthyphron, Hippias 
Majeur, Charmide, Laches, Lysis). Car si jamais l'enquete dialectique parvient i I'Essence, ce 
doit etre par l'ascension jusqu'au principe inconditionné, donc, nous I'avons vu, 3 un moment 
qui se place entre la notion definitionnelle et la determination (. . .) Cessence apparaitra au cours 
de cette critique, mais il est probable qu'elle ne se montrera pas en pleine lumiere, puisque aussi 
bien l'entreprise se terminera par un échec.» 
4. Here we mean the Aristotelian comprehension of «definition» which, we believe, has had 
such an important influence on the reading of Plato's aporetical dialogues. See Metaphysics, 13, 
4, 1078b, where the quest for «definition» is attributed to Socrates ( Ó ~ i ~ ~ o 0 u i  xu00hou) and 
Posterior Analitics 11 3, 90b and €f., where Aristotle analyzes the universal definiton and works 
out its typology. If the dialogues receive the name of aporetical, it is for the reason that they don't 
succeed in establishing what the «what is» of any of the values X under examination is. The ab- 
sence of definition is generally attributed to Plato's younger age. In fact, Plato is aiming at com- 
prehension rather than at the Aristotelian «definition». 
in spite of the fact that it has not been possible to define what a friend is, it is 
indeed possible to succeed in comprehending and accomplishing friendship. 
If we focus again on the last words of the Lysis (223b7-8), quoted at the be- 
ginning of this paper, we will notice that they are part of a wider context, a par- 
ticularly relevant one. When Plato says: «What a friend is, we have not yet 
succeeded in discovering» (223b7-8), we cannot leave aside the immediate 
context where we can read: «However, just as they were moving off, 1 re- 
marked: To-day, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves ridiculous -1, 
an old man, as well as you. For these others will go away and te11 how we be- 
lieve we are friends of one another -Eor 1 count myself in with you- but (what 
a friend is, we have not yet succeeded in discovering)» (Opos 6' Eyoye 46q 
&XLÓYTCOV aG~iñ)v, NGv piv, fiv 6' Eyh, h AWOL TE ilai MEVÉEEYE, rima- 
y i h a a t o ~  yeyóvap~v- Eyh TE, yiewv &v.Jle, ilai 5p~Ls. E Q O ~ O L  y&@ O L ~ E  
& ~ L O ~ T E S  Os o i ó p ~ e a  f i p ~ ? ; ~  &hh.Jlhwv cpihol Elval -xai EpE y" Qv 5piv 
Tieqpl- O ~ X C O  6E OTL E ~ T L V  O cpihoc oloi TE Eyevóp~Ba EEEWQEW: 223b3-8). 
From the aforementioned text, we' would like to note the following points: 
a) Socrates, once the reunion has come to an end ( G ~ e h 6 o a p ~ v  tqv  
ouvovoiav: 223b35) and the participants are about to leave, speaks to Lysis and 
Menexenus (and to the readers!) to swmmarily explain what has occurred and 
this is, in our view, one of the hermeneutical clues to the dialogue, just as we 
will explain further on; b) Socrates' verification of the ridiculousness of the 
situation of the participants in the conversation ( x a ~ a y i h a o z o l  yeyóvap~v: 
223b4-5), as it has been put forward by the reflection (or logical discourse) on 
the relationship existing between the friends, marks a very important point for 
the comprehension of the structure of the dialogue and the explanation of its 
contents; c )  even though Socrates narrates the scene (and the whole dialogue) 
in the first person, here he plays the literary game that consists in making others 
(«these others will go away and tell»: 223b 5-6) say what they think concem- 
ing the ridiculousness of Socrates, Lysis and Menexenus' situation. These 
others may be metaphorically taken as «the readers», attentive to the conver- 
sation but still not skilful enough to be able to take part in it and understand it6. 
5. We must remark the closeness between the name of the protagonist A I ~ S  and the 
B L E ~ ~ O U ~ E V  at the end of the dialogue. A closeness achieved by making use of a verb that has to 
do, like Lysis' name, with «realising» and with «dissolving». After the meeting, a metaphorical 
«realising» has been accomplished, and with it the ability to think without help from that mom- 
nent on has been obtained. Socrates, the friend, has made it possible insofar as he has taken the 
role of a mentor in directing the accomplishment of friendship. 
6. Here, as well as in other places, the personality and name of the sophist Miccus (204a5) 
acquires its full sense; it is a sophist named Miccus (someone of little importante; derived from 
the Greek M i x g o ~ )  who is described as a «no slight person, but a qualified professor~ (o6 
rpctuhó~ y& & v ~ Q ,  &hh' ixctvo~ oorpla-cr~: 204&6-7). This sophist, «cornrade» and «supporter» 
of Socrates (Los kzaigós ye, 6 6' 65, nui  E X ~ L V ~ T ~ S ,  Míxr.05: 204"s) is the person who teaches 
in the palaestra where the conversations take place in this dialogue. Accordingly, the young men 
who attended it were taught by a sophist «of little importancez and, as a consequence, could not 
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In the text, they are simple listeners that eventually go away and draw their own 
conclusions about the meeting. By making a note of the fact that these others 
do tell, Plato means to warn us about their partial conclusion: d)  the contents to 
which «the others» make reference, are precisely the confirmation of the ab- 
sence of an outcome in Socratic investigations: «what a friend is, we have not 
yet succeeded in discovering» (223b7-8). 
From the above-mentioned text, namely from 223b3-8, we have reserved 
until now an excerpt which, according to our judgment, is a capital passage, 
only to deal with it in detail now. It is the following one: «we believe we are 
friends of one another -for 1 count myself in with you- but . . .» (OS oiÓpe0a 
4y~T; &hh.Jlhov cpihoi E ~ ~ U L  -xai EyE ya@ Ev 6piv t;011y~-: 223b6-7). Plato 
thought it essential to place this passage here. It is an excerpt which consists 
of two propositions: the first one, Os oiópe0a 4pei; &hhqhov cpiho~ dvcr~,  
sets down Socrates' self-awareness, which can be extended to Lysjs and 
Menexenus, (o iÓp~0a)  of reciprocal friendship (&hhqhov) among the inter- 
locutor~ of the scene; the second one reasons Socrates' specific self-aware- 
ness: ilai EpE y&@ Ev 6piv ~ i e q p i ,  and puts forward Socrates' primacy when 
it comes to realizing an already-realized friendship, that is comprehending an 
accomplished friendship. 
We would like specifically to underline the importance of oiÓye0a in the 
first proposition. Plato does indeed make Socrates use a present of the indica- 
tive mood and, in doing so, stresses the verbal aspect of continuousness. When 
Socrates says: «we believe», he intends to let it be known that, at the end of the 
dialogue, neither he nor his interlocutors have been able to discover what a 
friend is, but still trust their already-established friendship. In this way, that al- 
ready-accomplished friendship, which has been comprehended through the di- 
alogue, finds its confirmation. It is true that Socrates had not met Lysis nor 
Menexenus; this can be deduced from the initial scene of the dialogue, one that 
is full of news, and from the way in which both Lysis (204el-8) and Menex- 
enus (206d3-6) are introduced. The whole situation makes us aware of 
Socrates' unfamiliarity with the two youths or, at least, we are allowed to sus- 
tain that between both of them and Socrates there was no friendship, even 
though there might have been some previous knowledge. Furthermore, as we 
have said before, this friendship, as it has been conveyed to us by the text, is 
characterized by its reciprocity (&hh.Jlhcov), which is precisely one of the 
characteristics of which Socrates talked when he explained friendship as a re- 
lationship, after inquiring about this relationship while he was addressing 
Menexenus (cf. 212a8-bl). 
succeed in perceiving that a friendship among Socrates, Lysis and Menexenus had been attained. 
Miccus' worthlessness can be appreciated after seeing that Menexenus' dialectical tutorship has 
been taken care of by Ctessipus. Thus, Menexenus has become a formidable person ( 6 ~ 1 ~ 0 ~  y&@ 
6 iYv0~wxos: 211~5) and a keen disputant ( E e ~ a z ~ x ó ~  Eoztv: 211b8) because he has been Ctes- 
sipus' disciple (Ktqohxow yu0qz45: 211~5). 
Of the second proposition ( m i  kui: ya@ kv 6piv z ieyy~) ,  we would like to 
underline the explanation (y&@) of the Socratic self-awareness of friendship. 
It is Socrates himself who states that he, for one, sees himself as a friend 
within (kv 6plv z ieyp~)  the friendship shared by Lysis and Menexenus and, as 
a consequence, he himself knows that he is their friend. We must notice that, 
in spite of Socrates' advanced age (see yÉ~cov &vre  in 223b5) and despite the 
fact that both young men are the same age, or nearly the same age (207cl-2), 
and that it seems evident that they are both friends, there is no impediment to 
Socrates' stating his friendship with the youths. In fact, in Plato's view, friend- 
ship is not a matter of age, but a matter of sharing the will to know, and this 
will is not determined by age7. 
In short, we may affirm that the context of the so-called «final aporia» does 
not allow us to perceive only the unsuccessful end of the dialogue and leave it 
at this pointx. The apparent final failure of the Lysis entails, if we take into ac- 
count the whole context, a very valuable achievement in the field of human re- 
lational attitudes: the reciprocal relation that produces friendship. In the same 
paragraph, the experience of an accomplished friendship asserts itself; it is a 
friendship that has been achieved as the dialogue proceeded, a friendship that, 
according to «the others», it has not been possible to express. Friendship is a 
human experience, a comprehensible one, but, at the same time, one that it is 
difficult to conceptualize, a hardly «definable» experience. Friendship is a 
human experience, which means that it exists in order to be lived. It is a «doing» 
that is difficult to «say». It looks as if between «doing» and «saying» (cf. 206~2-  
3) a disharmony had arisen, but it is only an apparent dishamony. Plato wishes 
to show that this disharmony is a hindrance that has to be overcome: there must 
be no imbalance between «doing» and «saying»g, they have to be complemen- 
tary. This is the great lesson that Plato learned from his mentor Socrates. 
Socrates was indeed ready to die (doiiig) for what he said (saying). The Apolo- 
gia and the Crito reveal it in a very forceful way. In the Apologia, we can read 
the most clear model of «aporia»: Socrates' logos finds no way out before the 
tribunal that will sentence him to deaith. But it is with his death that his logos 
is fulfilled. This apparent contradiction of «aporia» is what gives sense to the 
same «aporia». Plato has perfectly intemalized Socrates and a good proof of 
that is the fact that Lysis himself echoes Plato's adoption of Socrates in his 
three speeches, where he shows to us his accomplishment and comprehension 
of human friendship. 
7. Cf. the reflection on age in 209a4 and ff. 
8. In the dialogues named aporetical and, in a similar way, in the Lysis, a definition is not 
reached, but the realization of something that has to do with the subject under examination is 
eventually achieved. 
9. Cf. H. G. GADAMER, Lagos und Ergon im platonischen «Lysis»: H .  G. GADAMER, Kleine 
Schriften. 111: Idee und Sprache, Tühingen 1972, pp. 50-63. 
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Starting from the consideration that, at the end of the dialogue, the friend- 
ship which has been accomplished as the dialogue advanced is clearly stated, 
we must now proceed to a second reading and pay special attention to the three 
speeches, which are preceded by an important scene where newsl0 is brought 
in; in these speeches, we are shown the accomplishment of this frienship which 
is, in its turn, confirmed in Socrates' own words in the final scene of the Lysis, 
a scene where aporia is taken to its highest degree. These three speeches, to- 
gether with the initial and the final scenes, shape the whole dialogue. 
There are three main discursive parts in the Lysis where Plato analyzes di- 
alectically different ways of establishing a human relationship. Once these 
have been duly appraised, they eventually come together in the comprehen- 
sion of the human friendship accomplished by those who have devoted them- 
selves to philosophical reasearch with Socrates as their true mentor. Socrates 
will thus become the friend insofar as he has interpreted and situated Lysis and 
Menexenus' friendly love, as well as Hippothales' erotic love for Lysis, anew. 
Their relationship, spurred on by the will to comprehend that they al1 share, 
will give birth to a friendship which Socrates eventually presents as a human 
experience undefinable by means of logical schemata, but comprehensible in 
its dialectic completion. 
The conversations (9 6E 6late~pfi toI xohha Ev hÓy0~5: 204a2-3) that give 
shape to our dialogue are three. They al1 have their specific function. Plato 
aligns them in a given order as follows. First, the conversation with Hip- 
pothales (and Ctessipus) in (203 a1)204a8-206d7, a scene that cannot be sepa- 
rated from the initial scene that precedes it and that introduces the whole 
dialogue in 203al-204a7(206d7); secondly, the conversation with Lysis in 
207d5-211a1, preceded by a scenic framing in 206d7-207b7 and an introduc- 
tory conversation with Menexenus and Lysis in 207b8-207d4; and thirdly, the 
conversation with Menexenus (and Lysis) in 21 lal-222e7. After that, we arrive 
at the final scene in 223a1-223b811. 
There are two extraordinarily relevant considerations about these conver- 
sations. Firstly, al1 three conversations are «Lysis-centrim, inasmuch as they 
unequivocally make of Lysis their central point of reference. And Lysis does in- 
deed appear as being «tied» to the others, as much in the relationship Hip- 
pothales has established with him as in the one Menexenus and he have. As his 
own name reveals'2 -AZio~g means the one without ties- Lysis should become 
10. See the interesting analysis of the introductory scene in F. J. GONZÁLEZ, Plato's Lysis: 
An enactment o f  Philosophical Kinship: Ancient Philosophy 15 (1995) 69-90. 
11. We cannot justify this structure here. Adetailed analysis of the structure of the Lysis may 
be consulted in E. SCHMALZRIEDT, Platon. Der Schriftsteller und die Wahrheit, München 1969, 
PP. 108-134. 
12. The play on meanings that is made possible by the names which Plato uses in his dia- 
logues is particularly remarkable in the Lysis. Cf. D. WENDER, Letting go: Imagery and Symbolic 
Naming in Plato's Lysis: Ram~is 7 (1978) 38-45. 
Lysis, that is to say, he should be free of the ties that bind him, and the same 
thing could be said of al1 those that want to become friends of others in a 
process through which human relations come to be relations of true friendship 
only after they have been freed (or untied) from the other false relations, which 
in our dialogue are present through Hippothales' relationship with Lysis (EQOS 
non-authentic), on the one hand, and through that of Menexenus with Lysis 
(cplhia non-authentic), on the other. Secondly, Plato's appraisal of these con- 
versations is, in our view, a capital datum. We can observe it in the use that he 
makes of the adjective ( n a z a y i h a o t o ~ )  in the dialogue, a fact that gives us the 
clue to the logos that, according to Plato, constitutes the authentic cp~hia. In ac- 
cordance with this, Plato describes Hippothales' relationship with Lysis as 
«ridiculous» in its literary manifestation: the verses, which are sometimes sung, 
and Hippothales' prose are «ridiculous», and both Ctessipus first and Socrates 
later, in 205b7.~2.d5, 206a1, testify to that. And the same will be said of the 
third conversation, foreseen as ridiculous (cf. 21 1c2: «. . .that is why 1 want you 
to have a talk with him [Menexenus]. So that 1 make myself ridiculous») and 
characterized as ridiculous at the end of the dialogue (cf. 223b4: «To-day, Lysis 
and Menexenus, we have made ourselves ridiculous -1, an old man, as well as 
you»). On the other hand, the central conversation with Lysis in 207d5-211al 
is never said to be ridiculous. It will be in this central conversation with Lysis 
where we shall look for a relationship of true cpihia. Socrates will, at this cen- 
tral point, become both the mentor and the friend, making of Lysis a young man 
open to a true filial relationship, one that involves acknowledging his own ig- 
norance and his wish to know and thus acquire the phronesis that will allow 
him to escape from al1 his ties, to truly unbind himself and set himself free for 
al1 the others, ready to establish links of authentic friendship. 
We would also like to make a brief reference to the first conversation; we 
are told there about an erotic friendship that becomes ridiculous because the ad- 
miration for the loved one -here Lysis- transforms this relationship in one of 
excessive friendship and, as such, one lacking in reciprocity. Hippothales ad- 
mires Lysis so much that he places himself too far away. Admiration always en- 
tails distance rather than approach, since a person is admired for the reason that 
he or she is not like the admirer; on the contrary, the admirer thinks the admired 
one is far superior to him or her and this is why he or she admires that person. 
The verses, the prose, the songs only help to increase the distance and, with 
so much (excessive) admiration, the friendly reciprocity of true friends is de- 
nied. It is the very admiration that makes the relationship fade away. This dis- 
tance is pointed out by Plato himself by making Hippothales stand apart from 
the interlocutors out of shame (cf. 20'7b4-6). Plato makes it clear that poetry 
and prose can hardly succeed in «sayirig» a friend's relationship. The criticism 
of a flattering and blurring poetry and prose is therefore manifest. 
In the third conversation (we will skip for the moment, the second one), 
Plato wants to reveal that one type of Friendship, the filial (cp~hia) one, is also 
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a non-authentic relationship because it is a friendship that occurs by default. It 
is a friendship that is presented from the beginning as having been established 
between equals, but we are soon informed of the constant comparison that both 
friends (Menexenus and Lysis) make between themselves, and of the constant 
rivalry that it has created (cf. 207b8-d4, . . .). The use of the Greek comparative 
adjective clarifies Plato's intention. Rivalry is indeed an evidence of distance, 
but it is a distance seen from the perspective of default. Plato's text makes this 
distance al1 the more clear when kie has Menexenus leave the scene under the 
pretext that he is to help in a religious ceremony, which is taking place at the 
new palaestra on the occasion of a festivity to honour Hermes (cf. 207d2-4). It 
is remarkable that, while the qualities of both friends are being compared, there 
should be no time to ask about their attitudes towards justice (6 i1caióze~o~:  in 
207dl) and towards wisdom (oocpózeeog: in 207d2), thngs that both, far from 
any comparison, would permit a true friendship. Justice and wisdom are the 
two virtues that, according to Plato, constitute the pinnacle of a virtuous atti- 
tude in the (Athenian) polis. It is thus that friendship confers a political dimen- 
sion on human existence. Al1 throughout this third conversation, there is a 
dialectic effort aimed at «defining» friendship and, as the logos moves on in its 
logical discoursel3, the fact that logical reason cannot succeed in expressing the 
human experience of a true friendship begins to dawn on us. We may surmise 
here a criticism of sophistics, of a perception of reality that reduces it to a lo- 
gical language that hides its polychromy. 
We will now make a final reference to the second conversation, which was 
not described as ridiculous, because it shows us the learning process of a true 
friendship. The logos that lies within is an educating logos. Socrates, the men- 
tor (cf.210d6), becomes step by step the friend as he causes Lysis realization of 
his own lack for knowledge and of his will to know; it is only thus that his 
thinking can be the thinking without arrogance (066' Oíea peyahócpeov 6, 
E i n e ~  Oírp~cov Ezi: in 210d7) of a man well on his way to becoming his own 
self, namely, the «man without ties». Here there are no verses (aedes), prose 
(rhetoric teachers) or dialectic exercises in logic (sophistics); there is only the 
naked word (logos) woven in conversation from the will to study in depth one 
of the most structuring dimensions of human existence: the relational dimen- 
sion. Al1 the first examples are taken from the relations in daily life (father, 
mother, slaves, coachman, muleteer, pedagogue,. . .: cf. 207d5) since it is both 
a learning process and an experience of happiness (~66aipovÉozazov $val: in 
207d7); after that, we are led to reach the conclusion that putting one's trust in 
others (cf. 209~3)  is not a matter of age, but of wisdom (rp~oveiv: in 209~5;  cf. 
also 210bl); and finally, there is a statement concerning the necessity of know- 
13. The analysis of the logic in the dialogue has been studied with scientific rigour in A. W. 
BEGEMANN, Plato's Lysis. Onderzoek naar de Plaats van der Dialoog in het Oevre, Amsterdam 
1960, p.207 and ff. 
ledge because knowledge make us freer (a6zoi TE EhsijOeeo~ Eoóp~Ba: in 
210b4) and more useful (6v & ~ E V  & v ~ q ~ h s l g :  in 210~6).  But this is a useful- 
ness that is exercised from a knowledge that allows us to unbind ourselves from 
al1 the false friendship ties and which, by doing so, makes us become wise, use- 
ful and good ('Eav pEv &ea ooqos yÉvy: in 210dl; and X Q . J I O L ~ ~ S  y&@ ilai 
&yaBoc Eoy in 210d2) for the others. We can see here the contour of a funda- 
mentally relational human being. It is for this reason that his or her relational 
aptitudes are the ones that must prepare him or her to be able to reciprocate and, 
as a consequence, achieve lasting and true friendship relations. In the conver- 
sation between Socrates and Lysis, Plato has laid down the base from which to 
start in order to attain that human fundamental attitude which makes a harmo- 
nious, true friendship possible (neither an excessive friendship, linked to EQUIS 
nor a friendship by default, in rivalry). 
Both the scenography of the conversations and the dialectic that is ex- 
pounded in them allow us to perceive a perfectly-structured reasoning, the 
objective of which is to make the hurnan experience of friendship comprehen- 
sible. It is an experience of which we are given three sufficiently-determined 
typologies that enclose possible ways of establishing a human relationship. 
Plato's criticism of the fake friendship models, those failing either for their ex- 
cess or their default, brings with it, at the same time, a conceptual position with 
regard to the values transmitted by certain (Athenian) Greek traditions that, 
however dazzling they might be for the citizens (poetry, prose, sophistics), 
break the structure of the relational sphere of the political life because they cre- 
ate an imbalance in the human relatio'nal dimension and disjoint the individual 
and collective fabric of the polis. 
The range of themes of our dialogue is very vast. Here, we have only tried 
to present an aspect that we believe to be relevant in al1 the polyhedric immen- 
sity of this brief but rich dialogue. The quick look we have taken of the aporia 
and the dialectic conversation of Plato's Lysis has made evident the forceful- 
ness of expression contained in Plato's dialogic narrative, which, in collusion 
with the reader and conversing with him or her too, allows him or her to com- 
prehend the accornplishrnent of friendship as the Socratic dialogue proceeds. 
The dialogue becomes a vehicle of friendship since it involves a mutual ac- 
knowledgment of an Z and a you. The dialogue is one of the original ways of 
doing and saying. It is in the Socratic dialogue where the necessary presence of 
the you is manifest; it is where we are shown the impossibility of self-sufficient 
thinking and the need to establish a reciprocal friendship relation, which will 
thrive on the mutual experience of true affection (8~05)  and of the word 
(hóyoc). Plato has offered us its setting and its accomplishment. 
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Summary 
En aquest article es vol posar en relleu, a través de I'estudi de I'anomenada aporia 
finaldel Lisis platonic (223b7-8) i del seu context (223b3-8), el caracter no aporetic del 
conjunt de I'obra. Si bé és cert que el dialeg no arriba a concloure respecte de la defini- 
ció -modo aristotelico (Met. 13,4,1078b; i Anal. Seg. II, 390b i SS.)- d'allo que és I'amic, 
no és menys cert que al final de I'obra s'afirma que s'ha realitzat I'amistat entre els in- 
terlocutor~ del dialeg (Socrates, Lisis i Menexen) [cf. 223b6-71. Aquesta realització su- 
posa que al llarg del dialeg s'ha anat telxint entre els dialogants una comprensió (no una 
definició) i, alhora, un acompliment df: I'amistat. En aquest sentit, Plató ens escenifica 
tres converses (hóyo~)  que expliciten tres formes possibles de relació humana: a) la 
conversa amb Hipotales ([203al]204a8-206d7), una relació d'amistat per excés (d'ad- 
miració), qualificada per Plató de ridícula ( xa tay~haazos ) ;  b) la conversa central amb 
Lisis (20745-21 I a l ) ,  una relació d'amistat que es va construint en I'encaminament vers 
I'autentica saviesa de la relació d'amistat, deslligada [= Aijoy] de tot fals Iligam, la qual 
no és qualificada de ridícula; i c) la conversa amb Menexen (i Lisis) (21 1al-222e7), una 
relació d'amistat per defecte (de rivalitat), qualificada també de ridícula. Hi són, també, 
implícitament tractades tres formes possibles d'educació de la relació d'amistat: a) la 
dels aedes i dels prosistes; b) la dialogal socratica; i c) la dels sofistes. El Lisis ens 
mostra com només la forma dialogal constitueix el camí que permet d'acostar-se a una 
relació autentica d'amistat. La filosofia, considerada així essencialment com a dialeg, su- 
posa el reconeixement del tu en la construcció d'un pensar i actuar veritablement hu- 
mans, els quals possibiliten I'harmonia dins la polis. 
